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Failure to Protect?: Applying the DRRI-2 Scales to
Rwanda and Srebrenica
Elizabeth Mason
Freie Universität Berlin
Berlin, Germany

Introduction
In 2007, The Mothers of Srebrenica, an organization which represents 6,000 women whose
family members were massacred at Srebrenica in 1995, filed a civil action in the District Court of
the Hague against the United Nations (UN) and the Dutch Government. The Mothers of
Srebrenica trial brought international attention to the role in which UN peacekeepers stationed
at Srebrenica played in the massacre of over 8,000 Bosniak men and boys by the Bosnian Serb
Army (VRS) under the command of General Mladić.1 During the same period, the actions of
peacekeepers in Rwanda, particularly those of Lieutenant Luc Lemaire, who by withdrawing
the 90 UN troops under his command, abandoned 2,000 Tutsi refugees to be murdered by the
Interahamwe,2 begged the question of what role UN peacekeepers played in the genocides.3
Were the UN peacekeepers helpless bystanders or were they a culpable party that had the
ability to stop massacres but instead made a conscious decision to allow them to take place?
This article reanalyzes both the situational and operational factors on the ground that
influenced the decisions of UN peacekeepers during their deployments in Srebrenica and
Rwanda. By approaching these events from a mental health perspective, it is shown that there
are numerous factors which gravely impacted the mental state of UN peacekeepers. These
factors, when combined with the operational limitations which peacekeepers faced, were
ultimately detrimental to their ability to take any serious action to prevent genocide from taking
place. I take a more in-depth look at the aspects of their experiences which the peacekeepers
themselves report as significant or defining factors of their deployment and analyze them using
the diagnostic questions asked of returning veterans found in the Deployment Risk and
Resilience Inventory (DRRI-2) Scales.4 The DRRI-2 Scales are an instrument used to assess
veterans’ risk of or resilience against developing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
following their deployment. The use of these scales will aid in shedding new light on the daily
conditions that the UN peacekeepers operated under and which only eyewitnesses who lived
these experiences can describe how they impacted their mental wellbeing and the agency they
felt they could exercise. This article sheds light on previously under-explored stressors that
1

“UN and the Netherlands Are Sued Over Srebrenica Killings,” The New York Times, June 4, 2007, accessed November 8,
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/world/europe/04iht-serbs.4.5992698.html.

2

The Interahamwe was one of the extremist groups, comprised of younger men, who participated in the Rwandan
Genocide. See Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2002), 54.

3

Journalist Chris McGreal pinpoints one of the key arguments against UN peacekeeping in Rwanda and Bosnia. He
states “[t]here were good reasons to question the point of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s and to wonder if it was
not costing as many lives as it was protecting by offering an illusion of security. The murdered Tutsis at the school
might have stood a better chance if they had fled to Uganda.” This typifies the criticism that UN enclaves in fact
did not provide an area where refugees could expect safety, but instead concentrated them to make them an even
easier target for the perpetrators who knew that the UN peacekeepers protecting their targets would not open fire
on them due to the rules of engagement dictated to them by the UN high command. See Chris McGreal, “What's
the Point of Peacekeepers When They Don't Keep the Peace?: From Rwanda to Bosnia, Haiti to Congo, Failures
Raise Questions About Future of United Nations Blue Helmets,” The Guardian, September 17, 2015, accessed
November 4, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/un-united-nations-peacekeepersrwanda-bosnia.

4

To view the diagnostic questions used to understand soldiers' experiences before, during and after deployment, please
refer to Dawne Vogt et al., Deployment Risk and Resilience Inventory-2 (DRRI-2) (Boston: National Center for
Posttraumatic Disorder (PTSD), 2012), accessed November 27, 2019, https://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/
assessment/documents/DRRI2scales.pdf.

Elizabeth Mason. “Failure to Protect?: Applying the DRRI-2 Scales to Rwanda and Srebrenica.” Genocide Studies and
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would have influenced the heavily criticized decisions of both UN commands in Rwanda and
Srebrenica in not doing more to prevent injury or death to civilians.
Before discussing at length the impact which the specific conditions of their deployment
had on the agency of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia and Rwanda, it is important to outline the
orders which dictated their actions and which they were expected to carry out as soldiers no
matter the conditions they faced. For the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in
Srebrenica, their mandate was outlined in three UN Resolutions: Resolution 819—issued April
16, 1993, Resolution 824—issued May 6, 1993, and Resolution 836—issued June 4, 1993. These
resolutions outline that the UN peacekeepers were to ensure that Srebrenica and the
surrounding area be established as a safe zone5 where the ill and wounded could be transported
from and to ensure both through forces on the ground and through negotiations undertaken at
higher levels that humanitarian aid could reach the enclave unhindered.6 In Resolution 836, the
security council also condemned all efforts by the Bosnian Serb forces to ethnically cleanse the
city of Bosniaks.7 Therefore, the mandate for UN troops in Srebrenica was to protect the safe
zone, to ensure that humanitarian aid was able to reach the safe zone and it was implied,
although not explicitly stated that UN troops should prevent evacuations of civilians by
Bosnian Serb forces.8 Finally, only in the last resolution issued, UN Security Council (UNSC)
Resolution 836, were UN troops authorized to use force in Bosnian safe zones. Use of force was
only authorized in cases of self defense, in response to bombardment or armed incursion of the
safe zone by any party involved, or if those parties obstructed the transport of supplies to safe
zones.9
Particularly for the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, the growing political concerns of
the UN, which will be discussed at greater length later in this article, played a decisive role in
the creation of both situational and operational factors which compromised the success of UN
peacekeepers in carrying out their missions and ultimately put them at greater risk. Initially, the
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) established in October 1993, was
deployed to see that the Arusha Peace Agreement was adhered to.10 This mission was a
challenge for peacekeepers from the beginning due to the presence of Hutu-extremist elements
in Rwanda, the political instability of the Hutu-ran government, and doubts within the UN that
the Rwandan government could successfully implement a transitional government.11 The early
Arusha peacekeeping mission was tied to political progress and peacekeepers on the ground
were confronted by early 1994, with a rapidly devolving political situation culminating in the
assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, reigniting civil
war.12 With the targeting and murder of Belgian peacekeepers and mounting international
pressure, this prompted the UN to make the decision to withdraw the bulk of UN forces in
Rwanda on April 21, 1994.13 UN troops remaining in Rwanda were mandated not only to
contribute to a cease-fire agreement, but to also establish safe zones and provide security for the
humanitarian aid being delivered to civilians. Most pertinent to our discussion, UN forces in
Rwanda were indeed mandated, unlike in Srebrenica, to “contribute to the security and
protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda.”14
5

United Nations (UN), Security Council Resolution 819 (1993), April 16, 1993 (UN Doc. S/RES/819), 2, para. 6.

6

UN, Security Council Resolution 836 (1993), June 4, 1993 (UN Doc. S/RES/836), 3, paras. 5, 10.

7

Ibid., 1, paras. 5–6.

8

Ibid., 3, para. 9.

9

Ibid.

10

Michael Barnett, “The Politics of Indifference at the United Nations and Genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia,” in This
Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, ed. Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Meštrović (New York:
New York University Press, 1996), 141.

11

Ibid.

12

Ibid., 142.

13

Ibid., 145.

14

UN, Security Council Resolution 918 (1994), May 17, 1994 (UN Doc. S/RES/918), 3, paras. 2–3.
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Since its first appearance as a psychological diagnosis in 1980, PTSD has come a long
way in terms of recognition as a diagnosis and also in its connection with earlier descriptions of
stress-related disorders including the diagnosis of shell shock during and after World War I.15
However, it is only with recent conflicts in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan in the early
21st century that PTSD has become a part of the public and psychiatric discourse prompted by
research with veterans particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom.16 One
characteristic of PTSD is that its onset is dependent on external events. This defining feature of
the disorder has led to a debate over the validity of PTSD as a diagnosis, questioning if the
disorder, which originated in the context of military psychiatry, has become an overapplied
social construct.17 However, especially for historians who study war, genocide, and
displacement, the reciprocal relationship between the psychological factors that drive human
agency and their impact on history demands further exploration. We would be dipping into the
role of a psychologist if we tried to suppose knowing the inner motivations of a person. What
we can reveal as historians are the events and pre-conditions that impact the agency of
historical actors. By looking at decision formation and analyzing the agency of historical actors
through the lens of mental health, historians have a new tool to understand the factors which
impact that agency. This article analyzes the accounts given by the UN commander in Rwanda,
Roméo Dallaire, the UN commander at the École Technique Officielle (ETO), Luc Lemaire, the
Dutch Commander in Srebrenica, Thom Karremans, and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
volunteers at the UN compound in Srebrenica to better understand, given the circumstances
under which the UN peacekeepers were working, what can we as fellow human beings have
expected from these men?
The tool that I will use to better understand the multi-layered sources of stress which
characterized the experiences of UN personnel in Rwanda and Srebrenica are the DRRI-2 Scales.
These scales function as a series of questions that allow veterans post-deployment to identify on
a number scale how much or how often they were exposed to certain deployment-related
factors. These factors either put war veterans at risk, as in, they put stress on the mental health
of the individual, or help them to be resilient, providing mental support against developing
PTSD.18 These scales were modified in 2012 to address a wider range of both intrapersonal
factors, such as sexual harassment and also increased concerns, particularly for soldiers
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, of insurgency warfare and exposure to nuclear, biological
and chemical agents. I have chosen the DRRI-2 Scales because it is the most detailed assessment
of a veteran’s deployment experiences, especially in exploring the relationship with the
development of PTSD and witnessing the consequences of war.19 This includes witnessing

15

See Nancy C. Andreasen, “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A History and a Critique,” Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences 1208, no. 1 (2010), accessed May 8, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05699.x.

16

For a more complete overview of PTSD as a Diagnosis, please refer to Nancy Andreasen’s article cited above. Ibid.

17

This refers to a response to the criticisms that Derek Summerfield presents in his paper where he argues that the
diagnosis of PTSD is currently being used by anyone who seeks to medicalize their traumatic experiences or seeks
compensation for “relatively commonplace events” such as accidents, muggings, or difficult pregnancies.
Summerfield even goes so far as to refer to this system as a “trauma industry.” See Derek Summerfield, “The
Invention of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Social Usefulness of a Psychiatric Category,” BMJ: British
Medical Journal 322, no. 7278 (2001), 96, accessed June 28, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.322.7278.95. However,
Summerfield’s standpoint was highly criticized by Shalev et. al. in their article “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder”
where they criticise any medical professional that questions the existence of a disease or disorder rather than trying
to relieve the patient of their pain. See Arieh Y. Shalev et al., “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,” BMJ: British Medical
Journal 322, no. 7297 (2001), 1302, accessed November 21, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25467014.

18

Dawne Vogt et al., “Deployment Risk and Resilience Inventory-2 (DRRI-2): An Updated Tool for Assessing
Psychosocial Risk and Resilience Factors Among Service Members and Veterans,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 26, no.
6 (2013), 716–717, accessed November 27, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1002/jts.21868; Dawne Vogt et al., Manual for
the Deployment Risk and Resilience Inventory-2 (DRRI-2): A Collection of Measures for Studying Deployment-Related
Experiences of Military Veterans (Boston: National Center for PTSD, 2012), accessed November 27, 2019, https://
www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/documents/drri2manual.pdf.

19

The other alternative for a set of risk-assessment scales would be the Critical Warzone Experiences (CWE) scales.

© 2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.3.1741.

30

Mason

injury or death to civilians, mass displacement, the destruction of homes and communities, and
the desperation of those people affected by the conflict. With their mandate to protect and
provide relief to civilians, the UN peacekeeping forces’ reason for being there was not to combat
an enemy force as with a soldier under normal rules of engagement, but to create the conditions
for or help to maintain peace.20 For this reason, scales which do not explore these experiences
would not be of use for the purposes of this research.
The revised DRRI-2 Scales were created to address the shift in warfare specifically
experienced by the United States military in the Middle East from the Gulf Wars to the more
recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan following September 11, 2001.21 The subsequent changes
were to address that the sustained conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan represented a shift towards
insurgency warfare, which involved smaller groups of paramilitaries who could be dispersed
among the civilian population. For this reason, for troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan,
missions could quickly shift from humanitarian missions to delivering lethal force.22 From this
brief overview of the background of the DRRI-2 Scales, there are a few obvious limitations in
applying these scales to understand the risk and resilience factors present for UN troops in
Rwanda and Srebrenica. The first and most obvious being that the UN rules of engagement
limited the use of force to such a degree that it was rarely, if ever, used.23 So, while their mission
could shift between providing humanitarian aid and protection to coming under heavy fire, UN
troops were not at risk of causing accidental civilian deaths by mistaking them for enemy
targets, unlike US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.24 Another key limit in the application of the
DRRI-2 Scales in Rwanda and Srebrenica is that the scales do not capture to what extent
decisions made at a higher level by UN headquarters in New York impacted the success of
missions on the ground. The indecisiveness and lack of international support in terms of
firepower or pressure from the UN high command and from its member states during both
peacekeeping missions was a critical operational risk factor which amplified the isolation and
sense of unattainability for UN troops in both locations to carry out their respective mandates to
protect safe zones and to safeguard civilians. This lack of support of relief forces, firepower, and
a united diplomatic and military response were not inhibiting factors, or certainly not to the
degree seen in Rwanda and Bosnia, for the deployments focused on in either the original DRRI
or the revised DRRI-2 Scales.
Despite these limitations, using these scales for the purpose of compiling information
regarding the deployment experiences of UN peacekeepers suits the scales’ original intended
function. The DRRI-2 Scales were created not as a diagnostic tool themselves, but to “provide a
research inventory of risk and resilience measures” to assess deployment-related factors and
what their implications are for the long-term health of veterans and servicemen.25 However,
creating or using such a catalogue of experiences based on their implications for an individual’s
mental wellbeing is often overlooked in historical approaches as a key force behind historical
agency. It is these personal and unseen consequences of experiencing traumatic events that
often give way to the large-scale events that shape history.
In Rwanda and Srebrenica, the massive operational restrictions stemming from the
higher echelons of the UN was a decisive factor which greatly restricted the actions that UN
peacekeepers in Rwanda and Srebrenica could take to protect civilian lives. However, what

20

Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide, 46.

21

Vogt et al., DRRI-2: An Updated Tool, 710–711.

22

Ibid.

23

Barnett, The Politics of Indifference, 154–155.

24

Though UN peacekeepers did not have a high risk of accidentally firing on and killing civilians within those limited
parameters, in both cases of the evacuation of the UN safe zone in Srebrenica and in Rwanda, the UN withdrawal
from the ETO were both decisive actions which directly lead to civilians being murdered. It is beyond the scope of
this article to compare the mental health implications of those two actions, but it is certain that UN peacekeepers
would have felt some degree of responsibility for those civilian casualties even if they were not the perpetrators.

25

Vogt et al., Manual for the DRRI-2, 2–3.
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remains under explored in the historical analysis of these events is how those operational
restrictions and higher level “politics” of UN peacekeeping limited the perceived or actual
decisions that peacekeepers could take at the time to prevent genocide. By reflecting on the
daily conditions, experiences, and limitations described by UN commanders on the ground in
Rwanda and Srebrenica through the questions presented in the DRRI-2 Scales, we can better
understand their impact on agency.
The revised DRRI-2 shows six categories out of a total of seventeen which have the
highest correlation with the development of PTSD. These are: Difficult Living and Working
Environment (56%), Perceived Threat (55%), Postdeployment Stressors (55%), Postdeployment Social
Support (46%), Combat Experiences (45%) and Aftermath of Battle (43%).26
For the purposes of my research, I will focus on what the DRRI defines as “missionrelated factors”—these are factors which have the potential to cause stress during a soldier's
deployment.27 Of those six critical sections, I will also limit my focus to the question sections
that have been discussed at length by Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, (then) Lieutenant Luc
Lemaire, and Colonel Thom Karremans and clearly constitute defining aspects of their
respective deployments with the UN in Rwanda and Srebrenica.28 Therefore, I will not be
including the section that focuses on Postdeployment Social Support, nor will I discuss the section
on Postdeployment Stressors. Furthermore, I will not be analyzing several questions from the
section on Combat Experiences (Section D of the DRRI-2). This is due to the fact that questions 1,
2, 8, 12, 13, 16, and 17 of this section ask if soldiers were involved in scenarios where they fired
their weapon, launched an assault on enemy troops or otherwise used violence to subdue a
perceived enemy threat.29 These questions are therefore irrelevant to the UN peacekeeping
forces in Rwanda and Srebrenica, as they were under strict orders not to use force to achieve
their mission.30 Additionally, a further four questions in this section that ask whether or not
soldiers witnessed a member of the unit of civilians being seriously wounded or killed are
discussed at length under the sections Perceived Threat and The Aftermath of Battle (which has
been identified in this article as Post-Combat Experiences and therefore will not be discussed at
length in the Combat Experiences section). I will also note for each section discussed in this
article, if any further questions are not relevant to this research and why, the most notable being
questions relating to exposure to nuclear, biological and chemical agents (NBCs).
Difficult Living and Working Environment
The first section I will be exploring is Section C of DRRI-2, which focuses on the environment in
which soldiers were deployed and the conditions of their daily lives during deployment. It is by
analyzing the accounts of the day-to-day environment that the UN personnel in both Rwanda
and Srebrenica had to operate in and the questions asked by DRRI-2 Scales that we can gain
some understanding about how those conditions impacted the mental state of UN troops.
Section C focuses on analyzing aspects of the deployment environment and living conditions
which after a period of time would have a negative impact on someone’s mental health. These
include questions such as: Could you sleep? Did you have enough food? Was the climate of
deployment uncomfortable? Could you shower when needed and were you living in sanitary

26

Vogt et al., Manual for the DRRI-2, 16, table 5.

27

Ibid., 3–4.

28

Hereafter referred to as (General) Dallaire, (Lt.) Lemaire and (Col.) Karremans.

29

Vogt et al., DRRI-2, 5.

30

However, it is also noted that the CWE scales provide a condensed measure of perceived danger during deployment
which tended to focus more on direct exposure to combat, which also proves problematic as the UN soldiers in
Rwanda and Srebrenica were under a strict order to not fire their weapons unless their own lives were at risk. See
Karen-Inge Karstoft et al., “Perceived Danger During Deployment: a Rasch Validation of an Instrument Assessing
Perceived Combat Exposure and the Witnessing of Combat Consequences in a War Zone,” European Journal of
Psychotraumatology 9, no. 1 (2018), 3, accessed November 16, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1080/20008198.2018.1487224.
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conditions? Were you allowed do the things needed to get your job done? Could you get as
much privacy as you needed?31
In Karremans’ testimony against VRS General Ratko Mladić at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in July 1996, he describes the conditions of
the UN enclave in Srebrenica as it was cut off by the VRS blockade one year before, from April
to July 1995.32 Karremans’ testimony reveals that if he or the other Dutch soldiers in Srebrenica
filled out Section C of the DRRI-2, many of their responses would reflect a high degree of
exposure to adverse conditions in their living and working environment. Karremans’ testimony
describes an atmosphere of desperation experienced by UN troops in the final weeks before the
forced evacuation from the Srebrenica enclave. He describes that due to the blockade, refugees
under their care were starving and without adequate medical attention while UN troops lived
off their combat rations for a considerable period of time.33 Their ability to perform necessary
daily tasks such as showering or more critically, carrying out their mandate to provide aid and
relief to Bosnian refugees were crippled by the fact that they operated without electricity for
weeks. This lack of electricity was compounded by the fact that the Dutch battalion also
experienced heavy rain which lead to cold, damp conditions and also several roads leading into
the enclave became impassable.34 Finally, in terms of humanitarian aid being allowed into the
enclave, the period between April and July of 1995, represents a distinct break with the ability to
negotiate the entry of humanitarian aid that the UN and other relief organizations in Srebrenica
previously enjoyed. Karremans makes it clear that the freedom of movement agreement for
humanitarian aid decided in 1993 no longer applied to Srebrenica by this period.35 This,
compounded with impassable roads and lack of fuel for vehicles, meant that UN troops were
physically trapped inside the Srebrenica enclave. Furthermore, the restriction of movement
meant that for the UN soldiers inside the enclave, there was a critical lack of supplies, of
personnel, and also no relief troops for current UN personnel who had been trying to improvise
under the critical conditions inside the enclave.36 Finally, before Karremans’ first meeting with
Mladić on July 11, he acknowledges in his ICTY testimony that he and the other UN troops in
Srebrenica had had no sleep for the previous five days. This was due to the intensified shelling
of the city by the VRS and the resulting displacement, death and injury within the enclave and
in the surrounding area.37 With the retreat of UN troops and refugees to the Potočari enclave,
living conditions were very similar in that they were exceptionally overcrowded; there was little
water in hot conditions and UN convoys which provided the only chance for medicine, food or
even for timely evacuation on the ground, were not allowed through Bosnian-Serb blockades.38

31

Ibid., 4.

32

It is important to note that Karremans’ account of the UN enclave from April to July 1995 represents a period where
negotiations between the UN and VRS to allow for free movement of supplies and electricity into the enclave had
broken down. This represents a critical period where Bosnian Serb forces intentionally created a very desperate
situation inside the enclave to leave the UN troops with no other choice but to retreat from Srebrenica. During the
overall period of UN presence inside the enclave from 1993 to 1995, there were indeed other periods of power cuts
and lack of supplies but often, the UN was able to negotiate humanitarian aid to be allowed back into the camp.
The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), July 4, 1996, IT-95-18-R61, 636–637.

33

Ibid.

34

Ibid., 637.

35

Ibid., 636.

36

Ibid., 637–638.

37

Ibid., 645.

38

Cedric Ryngaert, “Peacekeepers Facilitating Human Rights Violations: The Liability of the Dutch State in the ‘Mothers
of Srebrenica’ Cases,” Netherlands International Law Review 64 (2017), 510, accessed April 18, 2020, http://doi.org/
10.1007/s40802-017-0101-6.
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Karremans’ account of the daily conditions within the Srebrenica enclave is supported
by various personnel with MSF.39 Those working for MSF describe the logistical nightmare of
trying to provide food, medicine, and adequate shelter for the enclave which was critically
overpopulated with refugees and consistently bombarded by heavy artillery fire from BosnianSerb forces.40 There are numerous references to the VRS barring vital humanitarian aid from
entering the city, amounting to as much as seventy percent of supplies not reaching the
enclave.41 MSF coordinator, Eric Stobbaerts, estimated that the city was filled with almost four
times its pre-war population.42 He also describes that the only food available in the Muslim
enclaves were flour, oil, tinned meat, and powdered milk, causing severe immune and
nutritional deficiencies.43 What the MSF testimonies do is help to give an idea of how the
environment created by the Bosnian-Serb blockade and bombardment of the city impacted
Karreman’s ultimate decision to allow the forcible displacement of the Muslim population from
the city in July 1995.44 It is also important to note, unlike the timeline of events in Rwanda,
which constituted a much shorter timeframe, the city of Srebrenica experienced these conditions
in increased severity over a period of three years.45 This of course, constitutes a prolonged
exposure to increasingly desperate conditions in the city as evermore refugees fled to the
enclave, more people became injured due to shellings and a critical lack of shelter, food and
water. The threat in Srebrenica that existed for months, if not years, prior to the UN’s
withdrawal, was that people were being left to starve, freeze, or die of disease and the UN, due
to the Bosnian-Serb blockade, could do little logistically to fulfil their mandate to maintain the
safe zone.46 To give an idea of just how injurious the daily conditions were to the health and life
were of those within the Srebrenica enclave, it was calculated by the Court of Appeals which
retried the Mothers of Srebrenica case in 2007, that the victims of the Srebrenica massacre had a
mere thirty percent chance of survival if they had been able to remain within the UN enclave
after July 12, 1995.47 This horrific reality of daily life in the UN enclave in Srebrenica left
Karremans with little choice but to withdraw on July 11. It is made clear through the MSF
reports already discussed in this section, that Karremans and the UN personnel under his
command faced grave challenges in protecting human life within the enclave due to the
obstacles that were present in providing adequate humanitarian aid and adequate living
conditions.48 As will be discussed in the following section on perceived threat, the chance of
successfully carrying out their mandate only would have continued to decrease for

39

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) International Movement, MSF and Srebrenica:1993–2003 (MSF: 2015), 28–29, accessed
J u n e 2 8 , 2 0 2 0 , a c c e s s e d J u n e 2 8 , 2 0 2 0 , h t t p s : / / w w w. m s f . o rg / s i t e s / m s f . o rg / fi l e s / 2 0 1 9 - 0 4 /
MSF%20Speaking%20Out%20Srebrenica%201993-2003_1.pdf.

40

Ibid., 36–37.

41

Ibid., 40.

42

Ibid., 36.

43

For Stobbaerts’ account of the Srebrenica enclave in November of 1994, see MSF International Movement, MSF and
Srebrenica: 1993–2003, 36–37. For further details of the conditions regarding displaced persons at the enclave, see
Ibid., 28–30 and 37–38.

44

In addition to the overall conditions described in the previous paragraph, please see MSF's additional descriptions of
the VRS shelling of the city and the surrounding area and the resulting mass casualties in the days leading up to
the UN withdrawal from Srebrenica. See Ibid., 48–49.

45

Ibid., 12.

46

The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, 638. For additional information on conditions inside the camp
please refer to the citations in footnote 42.

47

Ryngaert points out that even though the Court of Appeals put a percentage on the likelihood of survival inside the
enclave for the purposes of determining the state of the Netherland’s liability for damages to the victims of the
Srebrenica massacre, this percentage should be valued as an informed estimate. It is impossible to know exactly
what would have happened to those Bosniak men who were murdered if they had remained within the UN
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peacekeepers as and if more shelling had occurred directly targeting the enclave following the
initial barrage on July 11.49
Regarding the conditions of the UN enclaves in Rwanda, Dallaire reported that UN
enclaves in Kigali already began to run out of food in April.50 They also reported that water was
an ongoing struggle as more people, especially wounded people, flooded in.51 It is also evident
from Dallaire’s documentary, that UN safe areas, for example the one at Amahoro Stadium in
Kigali, became, in his words, “like a concentration camp.”52 Amahoro Stadium at its most
critical point, swelled with an estimated twelve thousand people seeking the protection of UN
troops. Dallaire describes that people were being protected by the UN who surrounded the
stadium, only so they could die inside due to lack of food and water.53 Furthermore, Dallaire
described the horrendous smell which was a result of having nowhere inside the stadium for
the dead to be buried.54 For the most part, in terms of movement on the ground, UN troops in
Rwanda, unlike in Srebrenica, did have the freedom of movement necessary to accomplish daily
tasks.55 However, Dallaire reports that when it became clear that the United States, Canada, and
even the UN were not willing to lend any support to the mission in Rwanda, it gave a complete
sense of isolation to the mission. Without any support, Dallaire reported that he felt
surrounded.56 The sense of isolation and being surrounded by the enemy that Dallaire
described became literal as the Interahamwe took, at one point, three sides of the city of Kigali.57
This sense of isolation to the UN missions in both Srebrenica and Rwanda was also a critical
factor in increasing the perceived threat to peacekeepers and will be discussed further in the
following section.
Based on the accounts provided by Karremans and Dallaire which describe the
conditions and environment they experienced during their respective deployments in
Srebrenica and Rwanda, it is likely that they and other personnel under their command would
acknowledge to having high exposure to the stressors presented in questions 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13,
and 14.58 Furthermore, due to the intense shelling of both the UN enclave in Srebrenica and the
UN Headquarters in Kigali, Karremans, Dallaire, and most likely many of the men under their
command would indicate, in answering question 8 of Section C, that they suffered frequent
exposure to loud noises during their deployment.59 The frequency of bombing or shelling on
UN enclaves will be discussed at length in the following section on perceived threat. The
comparison of DRRI-2 and the accounts of Karremans and Dallaire show that they were
exposed to many stressors that originated from the daily environment in which they worked.
Their descriptions show that they were in extremely uncomfortable conditions for months on
end and that environment also became increasingly restricted as a physical space. Therefore, it
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is only logical that Karremans, Dallaire and any peacekeeper holding a position of command in
Rwanda and Srebrenica would not entertain any options that would either prolong or intensify
the desperate conditions that they were working in. This includes the decision made by
Karremans to agree to a withdrawal of UN troops from the Srebrenica-Potočari compound on
July 21, 1995.
Perceived Threat
Section G of the DRRI-2 titled Deployment Concerns, focuses on the dangers that soldiers felt they
were exposed to during their deployment.60 There are several questions in this section that focus
on biological concerns such as infectious disease, medicines available, and exposure to NBCs
which, from Karremans, Lemaire, and Dallaire’s accounts of UN deployment in Bosnia and
Rwanda, are not discussed as primary points of concern. Due to that fact, I will not discuss
threat of infectious disease or exposure to NBCs as stressors that impacted the spectrum of
action in which the UN operated in. However, what UN peacekeepers’ accounts can attest to is
the perceived threat from shelling, direct threats including assassination and in the case of
Rwanda, other artillery such as Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), from various elements
present in the two conflict zones. Through Dallaire and Karremans’ testimonies, it is apparent
that even as a peacekeeping force, the lives of UN peacekeepers faced numerous threats during
their deployment.
Karremans and the UN peacekeeping force in Srebrenica were aware, due to the
restriction of movement in or out of the enclave due to bad weather and the Bosnian Serb
blockade, that if the city was shelled, they would not be able to organize a timely evacuation.61
Karreman's ICTY testimony demonstrates that he felt the conditions inside the enclave were
inhumane and that due to the restriction of movement in or out of the enclave, refugees and UN
personnel alike, were trapped inside the enclave.62 Beginning on July 6, 1995, the city came
under direct assault by the VRS under the command of General Mladić. The area surrounding
the enclave fell under heavy shelling from the artillery which completely surrounded the city.
This lasted until July 11 when the UN enclave itself was shelled directly, constituting an
immediate threat to the lives of all inside the enclave.63 The shelling between July 6 and July 11
displaced an estimated 40,000 refugees,64 roughly 19,000–25,000 of which fled to the Potočari
compound approximately six kilometers northwest of the city.65 It is important to note that even
if the defense of the Srebrenica enclave was no longer attainable, that upon leaving, the UN’s
mission was compromised not only in terms of their ability to protect refugees, but also by
moving to a position which rendered them more vulnerable to attack.66 In terms of UN troops
being able to respond with use of force to VRS attacks, the only option for Karremans at
Srebrenica was to request close air support from NATO. During the period between July 6 and
July 11, NATO only provided close air support starting at 2pm on July 11.67 However,
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Karremans testified that he felt NATO support was “too little, too late” and in fact, lead to
further aggression and threats made by General Mladić to shell the enclave at Potočari.68
There are also numerous examples of threats and intimidation tactics which contributed
to the perceived threat to the Dutchbat. In one of their meetings, General Mladić directly
threatened to shell UN troops and the thousands of refugees under UN protection if Karremans
was not able to stop NATO air strikes against the VRS.69 Karremans’ testimony also indicates
that he felt Mladić had the military capability to carry out this threat and that there was no
safety from Bosnian Serb shelling either at Srebrenica or later at the enclave at Potočari.70
During their first meeting and even before, via radio communication, General Mladić indicated
that if the air strikes against his troops were not stopped, he was willing to directly shell the UN
compound and the immediate surrounding areas which risked not only mass refugee but UN
casualties as well.71 Mladić’s threat of shelling is also further confirmed by the Nederlands
Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) report on Srebrenica. The NIOD report states that
the VRS’s mortars and guns were directly visible from the entrance gate to the Potočari
compound and would have caused “carnage among densely packed masses of refugees.”72
These numerous factors left Karremans and the other UN troops both powerless and extremely
vulnerable to attack because they had no effective means with which to engage the VRS if fired
upon.73
At the critical point of evacuating refugees out of Potočari beginning on July 12,
Dutchbat troops have been accused of “aiding” the separation of male refugees which
ultimately allowed for the massacre of one hundred to four hundred men from the Potočari
compound.74 Very much so, the VRS forces controlled this event. Not only by design, through
ensuring that they provided the only transportation which could access the compound, but also
by disarming UN troops during the evacuations. Going beyond simply forcing peacekeepers at
gunpoint to discard their weapons and flak jackets, one VRS soldier “demonstrated” that the
UN flak jackets could not stand up to their armor-piercing rounds.75 So not only was there
physical disarming of UN troops, this one instance served as a further psychological
reinforcement that even if they had this protection (which had now been removed from them),
UN troops did not stand a chance in a combat situation against the VRS. If they did not comply
with the evacuation of refugees under VRS terms, even if they witnessed the separation of ablebodied men from refugee line-ups, there would be no barrier to them being eliminated should
they resist.76
In Rwanda, General Dallaire believed the Interahamwe were emboldened by stories of
how the UN presence as a peacekeeping force sent to protect the civilian population in Bosnia
was essentially disregarded by Bosnian Serb forces. Dallaire also felt that the Interahamwe’s use
of intimidation in attacking and even killing UN personnel was also a viable tactic to encourage
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UN forces to withdraw rather than risk casualties.77 Therefore, unlike in Bosnia, the
Interahamwe had no hesitation in directly targeting UN personnel with bombs, grenades, land
mines and other forms of firepower. In his documentary, Dallaire casually laughs during his
ten-year anniversary return to Rwanda “[e]ven driving down this road without someone taking
pot shots at you is already an improvement.”78 Dallaire also noted the fear among UN staff at
headquarters in Kigali when the building came under direct bombardment with grenades and
machine gun fire starting in mid-April 1994. These bombardments carried on for months and
extensively disrupted the day to day workings of the UN forces, as all personnel were forced to
retreat to the ground floor of the UN headquarters building during the bombardments.79
Based on Dallaire’s account of the UN mission in Rwanda, there was an omnipresent
threat to life due to unidentified persons, but almost certainly the Interahamwe, who fired at
UN trucks whilst out on the streets performing their duties and also direct bombardment on the
UN headquarters in Kigali. Another example of intimidation tactics used by the Interahamwe
which was perceived as a threat to peacekeepers’ safety were described by Lemaire at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1997.80 In his testimony, Lemaire
commented that during the period where refugees were gathering to the UN safe zone at the
ETO (also referred to as the Don Bosco School), there was a constant presence by the
Interahamwe monitoring their activities.81 He noted that they would watch the enclave from the
crossroads 300-meters up the road from the school; and as time went on, those groups got
bigger, up to fifteen people sometimes with weapons. In addition, vehicles full of Interahamwe
would regularly drive by. Gunfire could be heard regularly in the area and was attributed to
murders being committed by the Interahamwe. Lemaire himself described the presence of the
Interahamwe as “being surrounded.”82 For Lemaire, it is quite possible this perception of being
surrounded was fueled even further by the fact that unlike in Somalia, where Lemaire and a
portion of his men had served, when enemy individuals approached in close proximity, UN
troops could not fire at them if necessary.83 In his ICTR testimony, Lemaire describes that the
rules of engagement for Rwanda put peacekeepers in close proximity to paramilitary forces,
particularly at roadblocks, in highly threatening situations and that due to the rules of
engagement, they were forced to yield in these situations. Lemaire felt that the new rules of
engagement, which only allowed for use of force in cases of legal self-defense, resulted in less
effective ways for the UN to carry out their mission and defend themselves. In this case, this
change in the rules of engagement particularly if any UN troops had served in Somalia where
they were heavily equipped and were authorized to use force if necessary, made the perception
of being surrounded as powerful as if they had actually been encircled by paramilitaries.84
In addition to the threat that shelling posed to the lives of UN troops, another added
piece of leverage that General Mladić and the VRS took over Karremans and the UN command
was that they secured UN hostages.85 The timeframe in which those hostages were taken
indicates that this move was strategically planned by the VRS. Between July 8 and July 10,
General Mladić attacked numerous UN checkpoints near the UN enclave at Srebrenica, so by
the time Karremans was ordered to his first meeting with Mladić, Mladić had 55 UN soldiers as
hostages.86 Naturally, the meetings with Karremans are significant because during those
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meetings on July 11 and 12, Karremans was informed that all Bosniak refugees would be
forcibly evacuated from the region.87 Furthermore, the targeted massacre against Bosniak men
and boys also began on July 12, two days after the UN hostages were secured. It is highly likely
that if General Mladić’s intention to remove or ethnically cleanse the area of all Bosniak
Muslims had been compromised, the lives of those UN hostages would have been under grave
threat.88 Therefore, it is clear that the lives of Karremans, his men stationed at the enclave in
Srebrenica, and the hostages, who were also under Karremans’ command were under grave
threat by the VRS. By July 12, 1995, Karremans found himself and his unit surrounded, unable
to carry out their orders, with no hope of backup or support and limited to no supplies. This
fundamentally influenced his decision to comply with the forced evacuation of the remaining
refugees by the VRS. This decision could be viewed as a withdrawal to a defensible location in
order to save some of the refugees Karremans was charged with protecting. It is clear that at
Srebrenica and possibly more so at Potočari, due to the operational constraints, rules of
engagement and enemy threat, he would have had minimal success in protecting civilian lives
or ensuring the safety of his men otherwise.89
In Rwanda, based on the accounts of Dallaire and supporting insight given by his
Executive Assistant in Rwanda, Major Brent Beardsley, the perceived threat posed by the
Interahamwe and other extremist factions, originated from the fact that they, in a matter of a
day, were able to execute a series of seemingly well-planned murders of any government
officials who could have soothed the mass tensions that had come to a head after the
assassination of President Habyarimana.90 This included both Hutu moderates and Tutsis
within government of which extremist forces within the military knew exactly where they and
their families could be found and murdered within days, if not hours, of the President’s
assassination.91 Furthermore, extremist propaganda made it clear that there was a distinct antiBelgian sentiment among the Interahamwe and other factions.92 This resulted in a situation
where, unlike in Bosnia, UN soldiers were not just taken captive, they were tortured and killed.
On April 7, 1994, ten Belgian peacekeepers were murdered by Major Bernard Ntuyahaga of the
Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), despite the warning sent by Dallaire on January 11, 1994 to UN
high command in New York expressly stating that there was a plot to murder Belgian troops.93
The murdered Belgian peacekeepers had been sent by Dallaire to guard the house of the
Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingimana, where they were disarmed and transported to
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Camp Kigali and were murdered by Ntuyahaga the same day.94 Dallaire’s command was
heavily criticized for not taking some kind of action to extract the Belgian hostages on April 7.
However, Dallaire felt that he was in an impossible position. Dallaire believed if a UN force had
gone in to rescue the ten Belgian peacekeepers being held hostage, he estimates that would have
risked “twenty, thirty casualties and on top of that, they could just blast the shit out of my
headquarters and my mission would have been over.”95 This indicates that Dallaire did not feel
at the time that he had the manpower or the firepower to launch a rescue operation without
risking casualties or opening himself up to an attack on his headquarters due to a lack of
presence there. Furthermore, he felt that such a mission would not, due to the likely loss of life,
be supported by the UN high command and its member states.96
The Interahamwe eventually became so emboldened that they threatened Dallaire
himself as the Force Commander of UNAMIR in Rwanda and issued daily death threats that if
he were seen by the Interahamwe, he was to be immediately stopped and killed. This not only
threatened the life of Dallaire himself but also, he reports that any UN soldiers who fit his vague
description were targeted and some narrowly escaped being killed before Dallaire could pull
them off the streets.97 The murder of the ten Belgian peacekeepers, the threats to numerous
peacekeepers while carrying out missions, and targeting Dallaire himself, indicates that UN
troops had numerous reasons to perceive a grave threat to their own lives during their
deployment in Rwanda.
Not only is it evident that the perceived threat to the safety of UN peacekeepers on the
ground greatly limited the range of decisions that Dallaire felt he could make, it also directly
impacted the perceived range of options that the UN and the international community had to
intervene and to stop the genocide.98 In its conception, the murder of the ten Belgian
peacekeepers on April 7, 1994 was intended to and ultimately lead to the withdrawal of UN
forces from Rwanda.99 As a political officer with the UN during the genocide, Michael Barnett
even went so far as to postulate that the UN took no affirmative action because of the risk it
posed to the UN’s reputation by becoming further embroiled in an “ethnic conflict that spelled
little possibility of success and only danger and failure.”100 Two weeks of deliberation, debates,
statements, and recommendations for action suggested by Dallaire resulted in the opposite of
any affirmative action; instead, the result was the withdrawal of bulk of UN peacekeepers from
Rwanda on April 21, 1994. This decision made it very clear that the influence or action that the
UN would exercise to prevent violence undertaken by the Interahamwe against Tutsi civilians
in the months to follow would be very limited.101 Barnett maintains that the UN’s decision to
maintain only a small token peacekeeping force was not made to protect civilian lives or to
prevent genocide, in fact, it greatly limited the operational capabilities of peacekeepers on the
ground. The small UN force who remained past early April 1994, remained to preserve selfinterest, to symbolize their continued concern and even to mask their unwillingness to send in
an intervention force.102 The lack of communication, withdrawal of the bulk of the UN
peacekeeping force and indecisiveness of the UN and its member states would have most

94

“Kigali Genocide Memorial,” Visit Rwanda, accessed April 10, 2019, https://www.visitrwanda.com/interests/kigaligenocide-memorial/.

95

Raymont, The Journey of Roméo Dallaire, 00:23:39–00:24:36.

96

Dallaire and Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil, 240–241.

97

Ibid., 380–381.

98

Barnett, The Politics of Indifference, 144.

99

This intent was made clear to Dallaire via his informant Jean-Pierre. He explained that extremists saw the Belgian
troops as the "backbone” of the UNAMIR mission and if they could force the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent,
the UN mission would collapse. See Dallaire and Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil, 143–144.

100

Barnett, The Politics of Indifference, 144.

101

Raymont, Journey of Roméo Dallaire, 00:20:17–00:22:24.

102

Barnett, The Politics of Indifference, 145–146.

© 2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.3.1741.

40

Mason

certainly increased the perceived threat and actual threat of the Interahamwe to Dallaire and
UN troops on the ground.
During this period of indecision, lack of communication and endless political
deliberation by the UN high command after the murder of the Belgian peacekeepers, Dallaire
recounted the event of the Belgian withdrawal from the ETO on the outskirts of Kigali.103 Today,
this event is one of the most well-known examples of how the perceived threat of the
Interahamwe felt by UN peacekeepers directly lead to actions taken by peacekeepers to
withdraw or remain passive in protecting Rwandan civilians during the genocide.104 On April
11, 1994, 2,000 civilians who had gathered at the school with the belief that they could expect
protection under the UN were murdered by the Interahamwe after Lemaire withdrew the
Belgian-UN troops under his command. As commanding officer, Lemaire requested permission
to withdraw to the airport.105 Dallaire also believed that Lemaire purposefully did not inform
either his commanding officer in the Belgian forces or Dallaire that they were protecting
Rwandan civilians at the site.106 In describing the circumstances which Lemaire’s troops
operated under at the school and what lead to their withdrawal, Lemaire addressed numerous
factors that presented a real threat to the troops under his command. These factors included the
severe lack of personnel, the change in the rules of engagement, namely the order to not fire
their weapons except when being fired upon and a lack of armored vehicles, heavy weaponry,
and anti-tank missiles.107 Lemaire believed all these elements played a role in why his troops
could not be effective in stopping massacres already taking place in early to mid-April.108 It is
also important to note that while Lemaire’s decision to withdraw knowingly was undertaken at
the cost of refugees’ lives, it is in part, a consequence of the orders guiding UNAMIR forces in
Rwanda at the time. Peacekeepers’ role at this time was primarily to monitor and report the
situation on the ground, act as mediators and to help uphold the Arusha Agreement under UN
Resolution 872109 and its extension under UN Resolution 909.110
In Rwanda, UN peacekeepers faced an added difficulty in identifying who was a
member of the Interahamwe. Major Beardsley referred to it as the “third force.”111 The
Government of the Rwandan Republic and the rebels, known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front
were considered the first and second forces, the third force that Beardsley refers to was the
Interahamwe. The first two powers in Rwanda agreed for peace with the Arusha Accords
signed in 1993; however, the Interahamwe were described by Beardsley as the “youth-wing
extremists” that were determined that the Arusha Agreement would not be implemented.112
Dallaire confirmed that during the Rwandan Genocide were as young as fourteen and fifteen
years old.113 Thus, this indicates that members of Interahamwe were not a clearly defined
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enemy military force. They were a fraction of the local population, and when not in the
Interahamwe’s brightly colored uniform, they were not readily identifiable as an enemy when
in plain clothes, especially because they could include children among their ranks. These were
local people, in many cases that turned against members of their own communities. In Lt.
Lemaire’s testimony, he points out that in the days following President Habyarimana’s
assassination, the UN command could not identify exactly who ordered the killing of the
Belgian peacekeepers. Lemaire states that “these potential enemies could be FAR troops,
gendarmerie elements or civilians who were working for Interahamwe because these people on
several occasions individually or in groups in a joint manner put our troops, the Belgian troops
in difficulty.”114 Finally, he also discusses the challenges his troops faced in protecting the
refugees at the ETO. Lemaire believed that due to one significant aspect of the Rwandan
Genocide, namely neighbors attacking neighbors looking to “settle their scores,” that
paramilitaries would risk invading UN safe zones if it achieved the purpose of massacring
those inside whom they felt had wronged them.115
Based on the testimonies of Dallaire, Lemaire, and Karremans, it is likely that the Dutch
army stationed at Srebrenica-Potočari and the UN troops in Kigali, Rwanda would have
responded negatively to all questions in Section G of the DRRI-2 that do not pertain to NBC’s,
disease or pesticides comprising the following questions: 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12.116 It is clear
that the UN felt that due to their lack of firepower and heavy artillery and additionally, the
superior tactical positions that the VRS and the Interahamwe had, that the decisions the
peacekeepers could make were greatly limited. Furthermore, in Rwanda, UN peacekeepers
faced the added difficulty of the enemy being sometimes previously unidentified or nonuniformed children, but who, nevertheless, were a threat to the lives of UN peacekeepers.117
These stressors therefore indicate that decisions made by peacekeepers to protect civilians
despite the risks to their own lives, were made through UN peacekeepers putting their
exceptionally vulnerable circumstances aside. It also should not be taken lightly that in both
cases where UN troops have been internationally accused of abandoning refugees to be
massacred during the UN withdrawals from Srebrenica-Potočari and from the ETO school in
Rwanda, that there was not simply a perceived threat, but a real and compounded threat to
life.118 In both cases, the enemy used hostages, direct threats, and showcased their immediate
armed presence by positioning themselves just outside the enclaves for all to see. Every day the
UN spent being exposed to these stressors would have also been spent dealing with the reality
that at any time, they would have no realistic way to defend themselves or the people under
their blanket of protection. Furthermore, both UN forces had no reasonable expectation of
rescue if the situation against them turned violent. This is a situation that few soldiers in
modern military conflicts, let alone civilians have practical experience with.
Combat and Post-Combat Experiences
Section E of the DRRI-2 is concerned with post-battle experiences. Its goal is to ascertain to what
degree a soldier was exposed to the suffering or death of civilians or fellow military personnel.
The questions asked in this section take such lines of inquiry as to whether or not a veteran
witnessed the death or dismemberment of either fellow soldiers or civilians, if they witnessed
civilians begging, saw civilian homes or communities that had been destroyed, or if they
handled human remains.119 Both Karremans’ and Dallaire’s forces were deployed to Rwanda
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and Bosnia due to the presence of or perceived risk that mass human suffering was either
imminent or already occurring in those regions as a result of civil war. This section will explore
the instances where both UN forces, in their efforts to maintain UN enclaves or safe areas for
displaced civilians, witnessed numerous examples of human suffering and death in their
respective regions of deployment. In the case of Dallaire, he witnessed personally the aftermath
of the murders of his own troops by the Interahamwe and assisted in the removal of disfigured
civilian remains in Kigali.120
At the UN enclave in Srebrenica, the experiences of the UN were defined by the goal of
the Bosnian Serb army to displace the Bosnian Muslim population and through depriving them
of food, electricity, and medical supplies to force both the Muslim civilian population and
peacekeeping operations to leave the region.121 While we do not have a direct account from
Karremans himself on his personal experiences witnessing the aftermath of targeted attacks
intended to displace and kill Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, we do have an idea of what those
working in the Srebrenica enclave would have witnessed regarding this based on MSF
accounts.122 It is almost inevitable that UN troops stationed in Srebrenica witnessed the
displacement of thousands of people as the enclave was overwhelmed with displaced civilians
either from the surrounding area or whose homes were destroyed by the shelling of the city. An
area before the war which housed approximately 6,000 people now held around 23,000.123 MSF
reports emphasize that these displaced civilians were entirely dependent on aid rations for
survival, but also critically lacked water and adequate shelter from the heat or from the cold.124
With only a fraction of aid shipments being allowed in by VRS, it is impossible to imagine that
UN personnel stationed at Srebrenica did not witness instances of civilians begging for food or
other assistance as MSF was operating under the protection of the UN within the enclave.125
Furthermore, due to the shelling of the enclave, the evacuation to the enclave at Potočari and
finally, the penultimate forced evacuations of all Bosnian Muslims to Tuzla, civilians seeking
UN protection lost their homes, their belongings, and experienced their communities destroyed
—not once, but multiple times.126 This indicates that UN personnel stationed at Srebrenica
would likely indicate a strong exposure to questions 1, 2, and 3 of section E which ask if they
witnessed civilian suffering as an aftermath of war.
Stobbaerts also indicates that UN troops would have been exposed to severe injuries to
civilians or civilian casualties. The MSF report indicates that by April of 1993 alone, five doctors
at the hospital in Srebrenica had already performed almost four hundred amputations.127 The
MSF team at Srebrenica received a steady stream of war-injured people throughout the over
two-year period that they were posted in the area. However, when the enclave itself was
targeted with heavy artillery, both the MSF team and UN personnel became direct witnesses to
civilians being injured or killed. On July 6, 1995, a total of six rockets, 150 artillery, tank bombs,
120
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mortar bombs as well as countless shells were dropped on the city of Srebrenica, with two
rockets exploding directly within the UN compound. By the end of the day, MSF reported that
thirteen people were injured and four had been killed.128 This demonstrates that UN personnel
in Srebrenica, though perhaps not as closely as MSF doctors and staff, would have also been
exposed to civilians and possibly even their own personnel, being severely wounded,
disfigured, or killed, especially when the enclave came under direct attack. These situations are
represented by questions 4, 5, 10 and (possibly) question 7 of Section E of the DRRI-2.129
In Rwanda, unlike in Srebrenica, it is confirmed by General Dallaire that UN troops
were also directly involved in the removal of bodies and regularly witnessed the aftermath of
massacres against civilians. In his documentary, Dallaire discusses how the smell of corpses that
had been left to rot in houses and scattered on the streets all over the city became so
overwhelming that the UN could no longer do their job at headquarters due to the smell. In his
biography, Dalliare describes the smell of the bodies and lingering aftermath of the massacres
that were already taking place within the first five days of the genocide. He describes his
memory of this in vivid detail: “The odour of death in the hot sun; the flies, maggots, rats and
dogs that swarmed to feast on the dead. At times it seemed the smell had entered the pores of
my skin.”130 In order to continue on their duties, the UN had to gather the bodies from the area
surrounding the UN compound and burn them only a short distance away from
headquarters.131 Another instance where the UN forces in Rwanda directly witnessed the
aftermath of an attack on civilians was on May 1, 1994, at the protected site of the Sainte Famille
church in Kigali. At Sainte Famille, a bomb fell in an area where thousands of civilians were
seeking refuge in a UN protected part of the church compound. When Dallaire and his men
arrived after the bomb fell, they witnessed a scene of devastation—“[s]evered limbs and heads,
children ripped in two, the wounded turning their bewildered eyes toward you at the moment
at which you can actually see the life expire from them, the smell of burnt explosives mixed
with burning blood and flesh.”132 Hundreds of civilians turned to Dallaire for answers, rescue,
and for the UN to protect them. These two accounts are some examples of numerous instances
where General Dallaire and his men directly witnessed the destruction of homes and
communities, saw the severe disfigurement of civilians, the bodies of dead civilians, and were
involved with the removal of human remains. This indicates that Dallaire’s immediate
command in Kigali would have also responded negatively to questions 3, 8, 9, and 13 of Section
E of the DRRI-2.133
One instance described by General Dallaire also indicates that he and other UN troops
under his command would also respond affirmatively to many questions in Section D of the
DRRI-2 titled Combat Experiences. In his biography, Dallaire describes an attack on a UN patrol
in June 1994. Dallaire was called to an incident where two of his men had been wounded when
their vehicle was believed to have hit a landmine and were then fired on again while trying to
extract themselves from the vehicle.134 Later, the wounded UN troops were detained by the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), who were allies of the UN in stopping the genocide. The UN
soldiers were robbed by members of the RPF and one UN soldier was minutes from being taken
away and killed. Later, the more severely injured soldier, Major Manuel Soza, became the
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twelfth UN soldier to die during his deployment in Rwanda.135 It was later confirmed by RPF
leader and future President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, that the attack on Dallaire’s men had
been carried out by the RPF, which constitutes as “friendly” fire.136 This incident from June 1994
and Dallaire’s previous wry comment indicating the frequency of shots fired at UN vehicles in
Kigali, indicate that certain UN personnel in Rwanda would likely report exposure, if not
frequent exposure, to the situations indicated by the following questions in Section D of the
DRRI-2: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11.137
The situations discussed in this section involving the exposure of UN troops in Rwanda
and Srebrenica to the suffering, injury, and death of civilians as well as fellow peacekeepers
have various implications for their mental wellbeing. One implication is these experiences can
trigger a sense of danger and heightened risk reminding peacekeepers that they worked in a
daily environment where the risk to their own life was quite high. Furthermore, every dead,
maimed, desperate, displaced, starving, or dehydrated individual could also be a reminder of
the failure of UN troops in carrying out their mandate to protect and preserve lives within the
safe zones. Herein lies one of the great limitations of not having a set of scales like the DRRI-2
Scales specifically tailored to UN peacekeeping missions. With both sets of DRRI scales having
been written to assess the impact of conditions and circumstances faced by the US military in
the Middle Eastern theatre,138 there are numerous aspects of the scales which are not applicable
or do not adequately address key deployment-related factors which were also a source of stress
and therefore limited the range of decisions possible for UN peacekeepers. One example
discussed in this section is the politics of preservation that stemmed from UN use of force in
Somalia, particularly with the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, which lead the UN security council
to review the authorization to use force to coerce cooperation.139 The negative impact of the UN
peacekeeping mission in Somalia heavily dictated a change in the rules of engagement that
peacekeepers would be expected to operate under in Srebrenica and Rwanda, which was
namely, to use persuasion rather than force to achieve their missions.140 However, Lemaire
expressed several times in his ICTR testimony that he felt the change in the rules of engagement
and the unwillingness of the UN to heavily arm its troops in Rwanda had a profound negative
impact on their ability to carry out their mission and stop the genocide.141 Lemaire also
describes that he felt Dallaire’s recommendations as to the number of troops needed and critical
recommendations to the UN in New York to change the rules of engagement to allow the
peacekeepers to intervene and stop the distribution of weapons were ignored.142
Fundamentally, the unwillingness of the UN to allow for use of force in certain situations and
the numerous examples of the UN and member states’ failure to provide timely military
support when requested left peacekeepers surrounded and unable to adequately defend
themselves if they came under attack.143 The overriding political concerns of the UN and its
member states in the 1990s provided an insurmountable obstacle to the success of peacekeepers
in protecting safe zones and the people within them. These types of stressors have the
possibility for many individuals to develop feelings of self-doubt, a negative view of the UN
whom they looked to for leadership, support, relief and the blanket blue helmet protection,
hopelessness, exhaustion, hyper-vigilance, and of course, fear for their safety which would have
all greatly impacted their decisions in the field. Without the security or even possibility of relief
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forces, adequate weapons, or supportive military maneuvers and under the kinds of daily
conditions described in this article, can we have reasonably expected peacekeepers to have
made different decisions that would have prevented genocide from taking place? Could we
have expected them to remain in indefensible areas, surrounded by enemy fire and where
peacekeepers themselves were, on certain occasions, directly targeted and would have been
killed if they had taken any action to prevent massacres from occurring? Was it possible to
expect this under conditions which are known to make soldiers in other cases, who are able to
use force if necessary, seriously vulnerable to developing serious and long-term mental health
problems?
Conclusion
The DRRI-2 Scales and other diagnostic tools for assessing risk or resilience to developing PTSD
provide an invaluable tool for researchers seeking to better understand the human agency
behind traumatic events such as genocide. By applying the DRRI-2 Scales to the experiences of
UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda and Srebrenica, we can better understand how the daily
conditions during their deployment negatively impacted their mental state and the range of
perceived options they could take under those conditions to protect civilian lives. Through
analyzing those daily conditions and comparing them to various questions from the sections of
the DRRI-2 Scales that specifically focus on deployment stressors, we are able to break down the
experiences that the UN peacekeepers had during their deployment to understand their
cumulative negative impact on the mental health of peacekeepers. However, the use of these
scales does have certain limitations in terms of how much they can contribute to understanding
the particular conditions and limitations that peacekeepers faced in Rwanda and Srebrenica.
What it should prompt however, is the development of certain frameworks of analysis that
consider factors such as daily living conditions, sustained exposure to combat environments,
exposure to injured or wounded persons, operational limitations, and perceived threat to life
when judging those who witness acts of violence, massacres, or genocide taking place. We
expected the UN peacekeepers in Rwanda and Srebrenica to have stopped or prevented acts of
genocide, but was it actually possible for them even as soldiers to achieve this under those
circumstances? In truth, we expected trained soldiers with inadequate ability to subdue enemy
threats in highly dangerous, stressful, and ultimately indefensible positions to somehow
overcome these circumstances and make decisions that would have put their lives and possibly
the lives of those under their protection at risk with little chance of success.
It is clear that the mental health of UN peacekeepers, which shaped the decisions they
made on the ground, faced multi-layered and persistent sources of stress that had to be
managed on a daily basis. The eyewitness testimonies explored in this article have shown the
daily conditions in which UN peacekeepers operated was a persistent source of stress. These
included lack of water, food, sleep, freedom of movement, and also exposure to horrendous
smells, including that of rotting corpses and loud noises from artillery fire. UN peacekeepers in
Rwanda and Srebrenica were forced to try to carry out their mandate whilst operating under
these conditions for months on end with no relief and no area to retreat to for rest. Additionally,
UN personnel were faced with the daily reality that carrying out their mandate to protect put
their own lives directly at risk. In Bosnia, the primary threat to life for UN peacekeepers was
mainly the bombing or shelling of the surrounding city, later escalating to target the UN enclave
itself. In Rwanda, threats to life came from numerous sources including the bombing of the UN
headquarters, land mines, and deliberate targeting of UN peacekeepers on patrol and other
daily threats and intimidation. In both cases, UN peacekeepers were also taken hostage for
purposes of gaining leverage over UN decision-making; however, in Rwanda, peacekeepers
were executed as a further threat to the remaining peacekeepers and to prompt the withdrawal
of international troops. Additionally, the safety of UN peacekeepers and those they sought
protect were under constant threat due to the fact that both peacekeeping operations were
undermanned, under-equipped, and were greatly restricted in the acts they could take to
defend themselves, the safe zones, and the civilians inside. Finally, UN peacekeepers regularly
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saw the severe injury, desperation, death, and displacement of civilians who were the victims of
civil war and genocide. They faced the daily reality of only being able to partly carry out their
mandates to protect and help civilians due to numerous operational constraints and lack of
support from the higher echelons of UN command and its member-states. In the case of
Rwanda, UN peacekeepers witnessed and even were forced to handle the corpses of murdered
Rwandans and in some cases, their own men, with shocking regularity and intensity. It is my
opinion that anyone seeking to critique the actions or non-actions of UN peacekeepers in
Rwanda and Srebrenica should re-examine their conclusions based on the current research and
headways made in understanding the implications of multi-layered stress that soldiers to
varying degrees experience in conflict zones and the risk that this poses to the mental health of
the individual.
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